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THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE IN FLORIDA:
A POTENTIAL BATTLEGROUND
FOR BORROWERS AND LENDERS
BRIAN MCKENNA O'CONNELL*
INTRODUCTION

The most common means of financing the transfer of private family
dwellings in the State of Florida is through use of a mortgage.' In Florida
existing mortgages are assumed in approximately 30 percent of residential
property sales.&2 For example, in Dade County in February of 1978, the dollar
volume representing the assumptions of mortgages was $42.5 million as compared to $23.3 million for new mortgages.3
The mortgagee-lender is usually not in privity with the parties contracting
to sell and generally has no legal means to prevent a sale. He often seeks
additional protection of his investment through his contract with the mortgagorborrower. 4 An accepted method of protection is to include an acceleration
clause in the mortgage or in the note which it secures. 5 Acceleration clauses
often provide that upon default, usually defined as failure to make an installment payment, the entire unpaid balance becomes due and payable.6
Acceleration clauses based on default are generally upheld.7 However,
there is dissension among courts concerning the legality of "due-on-sale
clauses."" A due-on-sale clause in a mortgage or a deed of trust commonly
*B.S., Florida State University 1976; J.D., University of Florida 1979. L.LM. (Taxation),
University of Florida, 1980.
1. Markham, Catch 22-Loophole Delays Home Sales, Miami Herald, April 12, 1978
§H at 1, Col. 4.
2. Id. at 6, Col. 4.
3. Id. at 6, Col. 5.
4. The general rule is that the legal owner of property, absent a provision to the
contrary, does not need the approval of the mortgagee to alienate his land. The mortgagee
is powerless to prevent the assumption of the mortgage by a purchaser because the consent
of the mortgagee is not necessary. However, the mortgagee is not required to accept the
obligation of the purchaser in lieu of the mortgagor. The mortgagee may look to either
party to satisfy his debt, but if he agrees to accept the new buyer, the one making the
assumption becomes the principal obligor and the original maker the surety. See 2 R. BoYm,
§32.14 (1977).
G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES, §326 (2d ed. 1970).

FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS,

5.

6. See, e.g., Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238, 242-43, 135 So. 510, 512 (1931);
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Taylor, 318 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
7. The prevailing view appears to be that such a provision constitutes a valid contract
and that in the event of a breach, enforcement will be accorded. However, a court of equity
may refuse to enforce the provision by foreclosing the underlying mortgage if acceleration
of the debt would be inequitable or unjust. See Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238,
242-43, 135 So. 510, 511-12 (1931).
8. An idea of how controversial the "due-on-sale" clause has become may be discerned
from the following excerpt taken from a response to an inquiry concerning the clause: "The
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provides for the acceleration of the entire outstanding balance of the debt
upon sale of the property by the mortgagor without the prior consent of the
mortgagee. 9 Thus, the due-on-sale clause is a specialized type of acceleration
clause.' 0
The inclusion and exercise of due-on-sale clauses has become more
prevalent in recent years for two basic reasons. Primarily, the clause provides
an opportunity for the lender to raise the interest rate to the current market
rate as waiver of acceleration is usually conditioned upon the buyer's acceptance of a higher interest rate." Secondly, the provision enables the lender to
protect his security interest by requiring prior approval before a prospective
buyer assumes the note and the mortgage.' 2 However, the due-on-sale clause
has disadvantageous aspects for the seller-mortgagor. The absence of such a
clause insures the continuance of the fixed interest rate which is usually lower
than the current market rate, making the property more attractive to a
prospective buyer.' 3 Additionally a recent Florida Supreme Court decision
which exempts federal savings associations from usury limitations,14 taken in

[Federal Home Loan Mortgage] Corporation anticipates becoming involved in litigation
matters that concern the questions that you raise. Under these circumstances, I do not
believe that it would be appropriate for the Corporation to express any views on the subject.
I regret that I cannot be of assistance, but I am sure that you understand the contested
nature of the topic you have chosen." Letter from Henry L. Judy, Vice President, General
Counsel of The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to Brian O'Connell (July 6, 1978).
States where legal challenges of such clauses have taken place are: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
9. See the provision in the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)/Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) form which provides: "If all or any part of
the property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by borrower without Lender's
prior written consent ... Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by
this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable." FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument
6175, para. 17. A due-on-encumbrance clause may be utilized by some lenders. It is usually
encompassed within a generalized due-on-sale clause which provides for acceleration of payments upon the sale, transfer or further encumbrance of the property, in whole or in part,
or any interest therein. See, e.g., LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 869,
97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851, 489 P.2d 1113, 1115 (1971).
10. See Comment, The Due-on-Sale Clause as a Reasonable Restraint on AlienationA Proposal for Texas, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 514, 515-16 (1976).
11. See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 170-74, 250
N.W.2d 804, 807-09 (1977). In the Nichols case, the court discussed the use of due-on-sale
clauses as leverage for increasing the interest rate on an existing mortgage. Such leverage
takes on special importance in view of the sharp rise in the interest rates on home mortgages.
See Bonnano, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California
in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. R.v.
267, 267-71 (1972).
12. See Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla. 1977),
where the court in refusing to enforce a due-on-sale clause stated that the underlying
rationale of such clauses was the right of the lender to be assured of the safety of his
security. Id.
13. See, e.g., Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973).
14. Catogas v. Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1979).
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conjunction with steadily rising interest rates, will further polarize these
interests of lenders and borrowers.1 5
An example of the factual setting of the typical due-on-sale clause controversy would be as follows:
A seller has found a buyer for certain real property. This real property
is encumbered by a mortgage which contains a due-on-sale clause. The
seller wishes to have the buyer assume the mortgage obligation. The
lender is then contacted by the seller who requests ,that upon the
assumption, the lender accept the buyer's obligation on the mortgage
in lieu of the seller's obligation. However, the lender directs the
seller's attention to the due-on-sale clause and the necessity for the
lender to consent to the sale to prevent triggering an acceleration of the
loan. The lender agrees to give this consent only if the interest rate
of the mortgage is raised to the current market rate. The buyer refuses
to go through with the sale because of the imposition of a higher
interest rate. In the absence of successful negotiating between the seller
and the lender, litigation over the validity of the clause ensues.
This article examines judicial approaches to due-on-sale clauses in conjunction with underlying policy considerations. First, the contention that these
clauses constitute a restraint on alienation is explored. Second, the equity role
of a court in enforcing the clause is discussed. Third, an examination Of
existing Florida law is made. 'Fourth, the important, related federal ,law is
examined. Finally, these legal principles are integrated with some practical
problems in enforcing the due-on-sale clause.
DUE-ON-SALE CLAuss AS RESTRAMNTS ON ALMNATION

Under traditional case law analysis, three basic approaches have been
formulated to determine what constitutes a restraint on alienation.1e The
majority's approach at common law holds restraints on alienation per se
15. Skyrocketing mortgage rates mean that the older mortgages -with lower, rates will
become even more attractive to a prospective purchaser. In contrast, while a lender's cost
of obtaining money has also increased, he will still be receiving the older and lower interest
rates on many of his loans. See LeSar, Your Dream Home May Become a Nightmare, Miami
Herald, November 5, 1978 §H at 6, Col. 3. The following illustration should indicate the
concerns of the Seller, the original borrower, and the Buyer with the raising of the interest
rate upon the sale of property. Assume a sale price of $60,000, the land is encumbered by a
30-year mortgage which has a balance of $48,000 and the interest rate on the loan is 9%. A
$12,000 payment to the Seller is made. The monthly payments on the mortgage at this rate,
including $100 for taxes and insurance, would be $486.21. By raising the interest rate to
13%, the monthly payments would increase by 27.9% to $630.88.
16. See Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation,
57 Micu. L. Rxv. 1173, 1174-79 (1959). This article by no means attempts to fully explore
the doctrine of restraints on alienation, except as it relates to due-on-sale clauses. For a
more detailed discussion of the doctrine in this area, see Volkmer, The Application of the
Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. Rlv. 747
(1973). The modern rationale for the restraint on alienation doctrine is that such restraints
violate public policy, as opposed to the old common law rationale that restraints are repugnant to a fee title. See Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since
Gray, 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 373, 401-06 (1935). Under the modern view public policy is protected
by the restraint doctrine in that commerce and productivity are not limited, "dead hand"
control of property is limited, the impeding of debt collection is avoided, and the -concentra-
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invalid unless they fall under certain recognized exceptions.' 7 Under a second
approach, however, restraints on alienation are valid if reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case.' Under this approach a court would
utilize a balancing test, to weigh the interests served by the particular restraint
against the social evils flowing from its enforcement. 19 A third approach utilizes
the balancing test in one situation, and then applies that finding of validity
20
or invalidity to all future cases per se.
Early cases generally hold that only a direct restraint can violate any of
the doctrines.2t Conversely, an indirect restraint would not be considered
violative of any of the doctrines. 22 Direct restraints are generally categorized
as either disabling,23 forfeiture,- or promissory, 25 and these three directly
penalize or prohibit the transfer of property. An indirect restraint, on the
other hand, exists where a restraint attempts to accomplish a purpose other
than to discourage alienation. However, the practical effect is that alienation
is restrained, if the instrument is enforced. 21 The due-on-sale clause does not
precisely fit any one of these categories, inasmuch as the clause does not
provide for blanket prohibition of the transfer of mortgaged property. Rather
it permits acceleration of the debt if the property is transferred without the
27
prior consent of the mortgagee.
Nevertheless, the clause appears most similar to the direct 28 promissory
restraint, which is typically a covenant or a contract in which the promissor
agrees not to alienate the property. 29 The due-on-sale clause is a contractual
tion of wealth is prevented. In some respects, the rationale is similar to that of the rule
against perpetuities. See Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n. 21 Ill. App. 3d 42, 44, 314
N.E.2d 306, 308 (1974).
17. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 1174-75. While the recognized exceptions vary, substantial agreement exists as to many, such as, trusts and powers of appointment, the spendthrift trust, and forfeiture restraints on a life or lesser estate. Id. at 1175.
18. Id. at 1176.
19. See, e.g., Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 63-64 (Miss. 1975).
20. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 1179.
21. A direct restraint on alienation is a provision which expressly or by implication
attempts to prohibit or penalize the exercise of the power of alienation. 3 L. SIMrEs & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1112 (2d ed. 1956).
22. Id.
23. Id. A disabling restraint attempts to withhold the power to convey from the grantee
of the property subject to the restraint. See, e.g., Dukes v. Crumpton, 233 Miss. 611, 620, 103
So. 2d 385, 388 (1958).
24. A restraint which purports to create a version or a gift over to a third person if
alienation is attempted is a forfeiture restraint. See 3 L. SIMas & A. SmiTH, supra note 21,
at §1131. See also Falls City v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 453 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1972).
25. See, e.g., Genet v. Florida East Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272, 275 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963).
26. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §1112.
27. See note 9 supra.
28. See Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580, 595 (1976)
(Lake, J., dissenting). The dissenter adopts the view that a due-on-sale clause was a direct
restraint on alienation. The majority, however, classified the due-on-sale clause as an indirect restraint on alienation. See id. at 584-85. But see Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
(1980) (such clauses are not direct or indirect
Venco P'ship, 206 Neb. 469, -- N.W.2d -restraints as a matter of law).
29. See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250
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provision which pragmatically hampers the transfer of property. The clause
in time of rising interest rates may make low interest loans impossible to
assume and homes harder to sell.30
However, cases which consider the due-on-sale clause as a possible restraint
on alienation ignore the direct/indirect classification. 1 A majority of courts
test the validity of the due-on-sale clause by a reasonableness test instead of
2
the per se invalidity test used with other restraints on alienation.3
Due-on-Sale Clause Litigation
The validity of the due-on-sale clause has been extensively litigated in
California. These decisions have generally been followed in other jurisdictions.
Examination of these California decisions and similar decisions from other
states illustrates the development of judicial treatment of due-on-sale clauses
as unreasonable restraints on alienation and underscores the present confusion
in the area.
The 1964 decision of the California Supreme Court in Coast Bank v.
Minderhouts- is regarded as the landmark case upholding the due-on-sale
clause validity. It was one of the first decisions to consider the validity of the
clause and to adopt the "reasonableness" test for restraints on alienation in
general.V 4 In that case, Coast Bank made several loans (secured by promissory
notes) to the Enrights. In a separate instrument, the Enrights agreed not to
sell or further encumber the land until the entire debt was paid. If such sale
or encumbrance took place, the bank had the right to accelerate the entire
debt. Upon sale to the defendants, the bank accelerated the entire debt due
from the original owners.3 5 Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated:
In the present case it was not unreasonable for plaintiff (lender) to
condition its continued extension of credit to the Enrights (borrower)
on their retaining their interest in the property that stood as security for
the debt. Accordingly, plaintiff validly provided that it might accelerate
the due date if the Enrights encumbered or transferred the property.36
N.W.2d 804, 805 (1977). The due-on-sale clause "directly and fundamentally burdens a
mortgagor's ability to alienate as surely and directly as the classical promissory restraint.
As such, the due-on-sale clause is truly a direct restraint insofar as the category of direct
restraint can be articulated." Id.
30. Markham, supra note 1, at 1, Col. 5.
31. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973);
Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 IMI. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
32. See, e.g., First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976);
Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
33. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
34. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 300, 509 P.2d 1240,
1243-44 (1973).
35. Unable to obtain full payment of the balance of the loan, the bank sought to foreclose on an equitable mortgage which the court held was created. Although Minderhout
did not involve the standard due-on-sale clause, the decision has never been distinguished
on that basis. The clause also allowed for acceleration if the property was encumbered, yet
the sole issue before the court was the due-on-sale provision. 61 Cal. 2d at 313 n.2, 392 P.2d
at 266 n.2, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.2.
36. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508,
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The court concluded that the due-on-sale provision constituted a reasonable
and, therefore, valid restraint on alienation.37 However, the decision is unfortunately ambiguous as to whether the due-on-sale clause is automatically
enforceable as "reasonable" or whether the individual circumstances of each
case determine the "reasonableness" of the clause.
In Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3s the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on Coast Bank to hold that a due-on-sale clause is a
per se reasonable restraint on alienation. 9 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings 6- Loan Association40 upheld a
due-on-sale clause as a reasonable restraint on alienation, citing Coast Bank.
However, the Colorado court described the relevant test as reasonableness
under the circumstances of the particular facts of the case.41 Later cases generally
assumed that the due-on-sale clause was valid in California. Various lower
court decisions merely cited the Coast Bank cases and offered no independent
42
reasoning for the conclusion that the due-on-sale clause was valid.
The validity of the due-on-sale clause in California was expressly affirmed
in Cherry v. Home FederalSavings & Loan Association43 which held that the
lender was not required to act reasonably in its use.44 The California Court of
Appeal in Cherry rejected the argument that the due-on-sale clause constituted
an invalid restraint on alienation, citing Coast Bank,45 and went on to give
two justifications for the use of due-on-sale clauses. First, the court recognized
the risks to the security from an unknown party assuming the original borrower's position."6 The new owner may allow or cause the security to deteriorate
or depreciate in value. The possibility of deterioration would justify acceleration of the debt upon the transfer of the property. The court's second justification, strictly a matter of economics, was that the due-on-sale clause was a
legitimate protection against the lender's "double risk." Loan agreements frequently allow a borrower to pay off a loan before it is due; 4 7 therefore, if
interest rates drop, the lender faces the risk of the borrower repaying the

37. Id.
38. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
39. Id. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
40. 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
41. Id. at 299, 509 P.2d at 1243.
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 527 n.3, 56

Cal. Rptr. 741, 745 n.3 (1967) (which merely assumed in a footnote that the clause was

valid).
43. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
44. Id. at 579-80, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138. The court stated that the bank had discretion in
the use of its money and could insist upon performance of the terms of the acceleration
clause without conforming to an external standard of "reasonableness." Id.
45. Id. at 580, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
46. Id. at 578-79, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
47. Id. Prepayment penalties appear to be more common than the court in Cherry
suggests. See, e.g., Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1978) (prepayment penalty in mortgage held valid). A prepayment fee is a
standard clause in a loan agreement providing for a sum of money exacted from the
borrower as a charge for the right to prepay the obligation.
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loan in order to secure a loan elsewhere at a lower rate. 48 On the other hand,
the court noted that when money is loaned at low rates with no mechanism
for adjustment to meet increased market rates, the lender loses the benefit of a
later rise in interest rates. 49 The decision, in effect, held that both the lender's
concern for the safety of his security and his interest in protecting the profit
motive are valid reasons for the imposition of a restraint on alienation. 50
The most controversial aspect of the court's decision in Cherry was its
consideration of the lender's economic position in evaluating the validity, of
the due-on-sale clause.51 This economic rationale was followed by the New
Jersey Superior Court in Century Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Van
Glahn.52 It held that an attempt to accelerate a mortgage debt on the basis
of a due-on-sale clause for the sole purpose of maintaining the mortgage
portfolio of the lender at current interest rates was completely proper, and
was' not a restraint on, alienation.03 The Cherry decision was also followed
by the Supreme Court of Nevada in First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes.54 "
The court determined that the due-on-sale clause was a reasonable restraint on
alienation and was automatically enforceable. 55 However, the court's, .sole
justification for the clause was the safety of the lender's security and no
mention was made, of the right of the lender to protect his economic
interest. 8 In contrast to the Cherry case, Sanders v. Hicks- restricted the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause. The Supreme Court of Mississippi adopted a
reasonableness balancing test, to be utilized in considering the facts of each
particular case.58 In addition, a threat to the lender's security was viewed'as a
legitimate interest of the lender. However, the court did not include purely
59
economic considerations in this category.
At this juncture the California courts apparently had adopted an automatic enforcement rule for the use of the due-on-sale clause as per se reason48. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.

49. Id.
50. See Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 NJ. Super. 48, 53-55, 864
A.2d 558, 562-63 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1976).
51.

See Note, Due-on-Sale and Due-on-Encumbrance Clauses in California, 7 Loy. LA.

L. REv. 306, 310 (1974).
52. 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976).
53. Id. at 561. In Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 1(1973), the court also approved of the lender raising the interest on a sale in exchange
for not exercising a due-on-sale provision. Imposition of this condition was viewed as
protecting a valid interest of the lender and was not a restraint on alienation. Id. at 303, 509
P.2d at 1245.
54. 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976).
55. Id. at 365, 550 P.2d at 1271.
56. Therefore, the argument could be made that where no impairment to the lender's
security was present, the court's holding would not apply.

57. 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id. at 63-64. The court explicitly left open for future litigation what would constitute
a "threat to the legitimate interest of the mortgagee." !d. It is unlikely that a desire to

raise the interest rate in order to increase the yield on a loan, would constitute a "threat"
as stated by the court.
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able.60 Later cases, however, began to encroach upon these precedents. In
LaSala v. American Savings & Loan Association61 a due-on-encumbrance dause
was at issue. 62 The due-on-encumbrance clause substitutes a further encumbrance of the property for a sale as the event which can trigger the
acceleration of the first mortgage debt, if the lender's consent is not obtained.63
The due-on-encumbrance clause is not as common as the due-on-sale clause
and is primarily utilized in California.6 4 The LaSala court expressly distinguished the due-on-sale clause from the due-on-encumbrance clause, affirming the validity of the former but limiting enforcement of the latter.65 The
California Supreme Court described the central rationale of the Coast Bank
and Cherry cases as upholding the interest of the lender in refusing to accept
a person upon the transfer of the encumbered property who was a new and
unknown credit risk. 6 The same justification however was determined not
to apply to the encumbrance6 7 because the first encumbrance would have
68
priority over the second.
For these reasons, the court held that the exercise of the due-on-encumbrance clause was legitimate only when the security of the lender was
patently threatened. 9 However, no specific situation which might constitute
a threat to the security of the lender was offered.7 0 The use of the due-on-en60. See First Commercial Tide, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 365, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272
(1976). In the Holmes case, the court found a due-on-sale clause to be a reasonable restraint
on alienation and automatically enforceable upon its breach, relying in part on the Cherry
and Coast Bank cases. Id.
61. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
62. The clause provided for acceleration if a further encumbrance was placed on the
land. The named plaintiffs in the class action had executed a second deed of trust in
favor of a different lender. After executing the second encumbrance, the plaintiffs were
informed by the defendant of its right to accelerate the first deed of trust. However, the
lender offered to waive the acceleration option in exchange for a fee and the payment of
a higher rate of interest, from a 6% rate to a 9% rate. The plaintiffs and others in a
similar situation then brought the class action. M. at 868-70, 489 P.2d at 1114-15, 97 Cal.
Rptr. at 850-51.
63. See Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 631 n.1, 526 P.2d 1169, 1170
n.1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 n.1 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 14 n.2, 480 P.2d 320, 323 n.2, 92
Cal. Rptr. 704, 707 n.2 (1971).
65. 5 Cal. 3d at 883-84, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
66. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The court also discussed
Cherry's economic rationale, describing it as "appealing" in regard to the outright sale of
property. This statement was based on the reasoning that in most sales the borrower-vendor
receives sufficient cash to pay off his obligation, and merely denies by operation of the clause
a "fortuitous" advantage of a low interest rate to the prospective buyer. Id. at 880 n.17, 489
P.2d at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17.
67. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 881-82, 489 P.2d at 1124-25, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
70. The court did mention some general situations that might affect the security of
the lender. First, in some cases, the giving of a possessory security interest in which the
second mortgagee took possession could pose the same dangers of waste and depreciation
as an outright sale. Second, the giving of a second mortgage might be employed as a disguise
for an actual sale of the property. Third, a second mortgage might leave the borrower with
little or no equity in the property. Id. at 881, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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cumbrance clause as a means of increasing the yield on a lender's mortgages
was explicitly rejected.7 1
Similarly, the California Supreme Court severely limited the application
of the economic rationale of the Cherry case in the sale of the encumbered
property by installment contract in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association.72 In the instance of a conveyance by land sale installment contract, automatic acceleration of the principal obligation was not permitted.-3 As in
LaSala, the legitimate interests sufficient to justify acceleration were limited
to preservation of the security from waste or depreciation.7 4 The court also
adopted a test which required a reasonable exercise of the clause to be based
on the facts of each case, with special emphasis' on the clause's actual restraint
on alienability. 75 The effect of restraints on alienation in a sale by installment
contract was distinguished from an outright sale because in the typical sale the
borrower-seller received enough cash to satisfy the obligation." In the typical
installment sale only a small down payment is received. Automatic enforcement of a due-on-sale clause when a substantial balance remains on the debt
might be unwould effectively preclude such sales, because a contract vendor
7
dueY
called
being
one
the
for
loan
new
a
substitute
to
able
Under similar facts, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Patton v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Association78 explicitly followed the Tucker decision.
In Patton the borrower had entered into a contract for deed with a buyer,
when the seller's lender sought to either accelerate the mortgage on the
property or obtain buyer agreement to pay a higher interest rate.79 The court
held that the due-on-sale clause could not be enforced in the absence of a
80
In
showing that the lender's security was jeopardized by the transfer.
8
Nichols v. Ann. Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Association, 1 the Court of
Appeals of Michigan determined that where a conveyance had taken place
pursuant to an installment contract, the sole basis for enforcement of a dueon-sale clause could not be the lender's economic interest in maintaining its
portfolio at current rates.8 2 Instead, the clause was held to be an unreasonable

71. Id.

72. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
73. Id. at 638-39, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. In Tucker, four plaintiff

jointly purchased a parcel of residential property for investment. A deed of trust with a
due-on-sale provision was executed in favor of the defendant. Several months later, the

plaintiffs sold the property under an installment land contract. When the lender-defendant
learned of the sale, it sought to enforce the due-on-sale clause which ultimately resulted in
a financial loss to the plaintiffs. Id. at 632-33, 526 P.2d at 1170-71, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
74. Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
75. Id. at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
76. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.

77. Id.
78. 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978).
79. Id. at 475, 578 P.2d at 154.
80. The court also relied upon an Arizona statute which prohibited limitations on a
borrower's right to transfer his interest in the encumbered property. Id. at 479, 578 P.2d at 158.
81. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
82. Id. at 171, 250 N.W.2d at 809.
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restraint on alienation, because the lender's security would not be impaired,
wasted or lost.8 3
Other jurisdictions did not follow the Tucker lead. For example, the
Montana Supreme Court decision in Dobitz v. Oakland,8 4 involving enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon an installment sale, did not follow the
Tucker court's reasoning. The court upheld the clause emphasizing that the
restraint was on a mere executory contract interest and not the ownership
interest.8 5 Thus, it could be inferred from this decision that the clause might
not be enforced in the outright conveyance situation. However, there was
conflict on this point as well. The New Jersey Century Federal decision also
involved an attempted acceleration because of a transfer of the property by
contract.8 6 In adopting the Cherry court's economic rationale in allowing the
acceleration, the court in Century Federalexpressly refused to follow Tucker.s Finally, in the recent case of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,s8 the California Supreme Court expressly held a due-on-sale clause unenforceable by an
institutional lender upon an outright sale, unless the lender could demonstrate
that enforcement was necessary to protect its security from deterioration or
default.8 9 Unfortunately, the Wellenkamp court did not specify any guidelines
as to what would constitute a reasonable threat to the lender's security.
Questions involving the buyer's credit rating, the likelihood of default or
commission of waste by the buyer would apparently be considered. 9° The
court applied the test utilized in Tucker by requiring that justification for
the restraint outweigh its practical effect. 91 Recognition was given to the
interests of the lender in preserving the security from waste and in preventing
transfer of the security to an uncredit-worthy buyer; however, the court refused to view these as justifying automatic acceleration. 92 While the majority
specifically rejected the lender's interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at
current rates as a justification for the restraint,93 the effect of financing arrangements and economic conditions on the seller were discussed. The court
83. Id. at 165, 250 N.W.2d at 805.
84. 172 Mont. 126, 561 P.2d 441 (1977).
85. Id. at 131, 561 P.2d at 443.
86. 144 N.J. Super. at 50-51, 364 A.2d at 559-60.
87. Id. at 53, 364 A.2d at 561. The court attempted to distinguish Tucker by referring
to a California Statute which merely prohibited unreasonable restraints on alienation that
had been considered in Tucker. Id.
88. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
89. Id. at 953, 582 P. 2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
90. See Comment, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: California Adopts the "Due When
Reasonably Necessary Clause," 7 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 173, 183-84 (1979).
91. 21 Cal. 3d at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973-74, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
92. Instead the court stated that whether acceleration would be allowed depended upon
the circumstances of each case. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
93. The court recognized the increasing costs of doing business which the lenders faced.
However, the court found that the purpose of the due-on-sale clause was to protect against
impairment of the security of the lender, not against economic risks. To place these risks
on property owners was unfair in the court's view, especially when alternatives such as
variable interest rate mortgages were available. 21 Cal. 3d at 952 & n.10, 582 P.2d at 976 &
n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 & n.10.
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found that the inability of the prospective buyer to assume a mortgage at its
fixed rate might effectively prohibit a transfer, and thus be an unreasonable
restraint on alienation. 94 Wellenkamp therefore, marks the end of a ten year
transition in California law from automatic enforcement to limited enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.95
Analysis of the, Interests Involved in Due-on-Sale Clauses
The courts which have considered the validity of the due-on-sale clause
as a restraint on alienation have weighed several factors. In the initial consideration of the clauses some type of judicial balancing is inevitably involved. Some courts find the clauses valid per se and are willing to decree automatic enforcement, with limited exceptions. 9 On the other hand, several
courts require a balancing of interests to be performed in each individual fact
situation. 97 It is critical to determine which factors merit consideration and
how they will be applied in each jurisdiction.
The first factor considered by many courts is the concern of the lender
for preserving his security interest. 98 This interest can be divided into two

areas: interest in the mortgaged premises itsetf 99 and interest in the creditworthiness of the person assuming the loan.10° The lender bears the risk of
94. Under economic conditions where loan money is readily available, the prospective
buyer can easily obtain a new loan, and thus satisfy the first mortgage of the seller. However,
when new financing is difficult to obtain, the prospective buyer will generally assume the
existing mortgage. If the lender consents to the transfer but seeks a higher interest rate, an
inhibitory effect still exists. The buyer will be less eager to purchase, and the seller might
have to lower the purchase price or even abandon the sale. 21 Cal. d at 950,,582 P.2d at
974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
95. The dissenter in Wellenkamp felt that restraint should not be found upon merely
hypothetical economic conditions. He further stated that the owner of encumbered
property with an unenforceable due-on-sale clause was now placed in a better position
than the seller of unencumbered property. Id. at 957-58, 582 P.2d at 979-80, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 387-88 (Clark, J., dissenting). The economic rationale of the court in Wellenkamp seems
no more inappropriate than the rationale of decisions like Cherry. Even if an economic
rationale is improper, the security interest remains, which the court in Wellenkamp
recognized and sought to protect.
It is interesting to note that a California court of appeal has given an extremely narrow
interpretation of Wellenkamp. The court limited the Wellenkamp decision to loans by
institutional lenders, when the encumbered property being transfered is single family residential property and the buyer assumes the loan. Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n,
89 Cal. App. 8d 875, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 580-81 (Ct. App. 1979).
96. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d I
(1975). In 'Baker the court found a due-on-sale clause to be automatically enforceable unless
traditional equitable defenses could be successfully asserted. Id. at 126-27, 333 N.E.2d at 5.
97. See, e.g., Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975) where the court held that
a due-on-sale clause was a valid restraint on alienation only if its exercise by the lender was
reasonable under the circumstances.
98. See, e.g., La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 880-81, 489 1.2d
1113, 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 859 (1971).
99. The "physical" interest represents concern for the depreciation, waste, depletion
or destruction of the property. See, e.g., First S. Fed. Say. 9- Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d
300, 303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
100. The "moral" interest includes the lender's determination of the sense of re-
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the reduction in value of the property, because if the buyer defaults, the
lender may not recover upon foreclosure the full investment represented by
his loan.''
This security interest rationale for the due-on-sale clause can be challenged
on several grounds. Most mortgages contain a covenant requiring the preser10 2
vation and upkeep of the property to prevent waste or deterioration.
Furthermore, because of today's inflationary economy, it is unlikely that any
lender would fail to recover the full amount of his loan upon a foreclosure. 1' 3
A second factor considered by several courts involves the economic interests
of the lender. 0 4 As discussed in regards to the Cherry case, the basic argument
is that a lender is entitled to a fair return on his money. 0 5 The due-on-sale
clause is a mechanism to protect against cyclical swings in the money market,
so that a lender is not locked into a long term loan at a low fixed rate."' Since
the lender bears the risk of a rise or fall in the interest rates, it is legitimate
for him to use the due-on-sale clause to obtain a higher interest rate if the
property is transferred.0 6 Various arguments can be made against this reasoning; for example, the borrower should not be penalized by the operation of a
due-on-sale clause because of a lender's inability to properly project future
economic conditions, i.e., rising or falling interest rates. 0 7 Even if interest
rates were to fall rather than rise, few borrowers would take advantage of a
08
prepayment option in their loan and refinance at a lower rate.
sponsibility or financial security of the borrower, considerations which may have been influential in the granting of the original loan. See, e.g., People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus.,
Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 38, 257 N.E.2d 406, 407-08 (Ct. App. 1970).
101. If the property were sold and the debt assumed by a new party, the lender could
not be assured that the new owner would be as financially stable or conscientious about
the upkeep of the property as the original owner. Id.
102. See, e.g., FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument 6175, %6. See also United States v.
Angel, 362 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
103. Interview with Doris L. Wisner, Mortgage Loan Officer for The Lewis State Bank,
in Tallahassee, Florida (Sept. 14, 1978). In regard to the lender's overall interest in the
security for his debt, it is interesting to note that his security often improves upon a mortgage
assumption because the lender now has two sources from whom to collect. Also, if the
lender approves an assumption, the new debtor becomes the principal obligor and the initial
mortgagor becomes a surety. See 2 R. BOYER, supra note 4. See generally Note, supra note 51.
104. Compare First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300, 303-04 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1977) (which refused to recognize a lender's economic interests as a legitimate factor)
with Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 364 A.2d 558, 56162 (1976) (which viewed such interests as highly relevant).
105. See Stith v. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup.
Ct. 1970).
106. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301-03, 509 P.2d
1240, 1244-45 (1973).
107. This double risk argument states that if the loan was made when interest rates
were low, the borrower cannot be forced to pay a higher rate as long as he keeps the
property. If, on the other hand, the original loan was made when rates were high the
borrower is free to pay off the balance of the loan and refinance elsewhere. See Cherry v.
Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (Ct. App. 1969).
108. The cost of refinancing, and the lack of buyer understanding of its advantages,
would militate against such a situation working only to the borrower's advantage. The
standard prepayment penalty which, in effect, limits the right to prepay by charging an
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A third factor considered by some courts independent of, or in comparison

with, the first two factors is the degree of practical restraint on alienation.0

9

One argument advanced by lenders is that due-on-sale clauses increase the

overall alienability of property by equalizing mortgage interest rates between
old borrowers and new buyers. 10 The opposing argument emphasizes the

borrower's interest in being free to sell his property without practical or direct
restraint."'
Determining whether the lender or the borrower should benefit from a
rise in interest rates is difficult in the absence of empirical data detailing the
need for lenders to be protected against such fluctuations. The same lack
of information exists in determining whether the due-on-sale clause increases
the availability of mortgage money. Even if this information were available,
it is doubtful if a clear conclusion could be gleaned from it. Therefore, these
factors should be evaluated on simpler, but no less important bases. Contract
law should be utilized to decide which party, if any, contracted for one or
both of these contingencies."22 Where a clause provides notice that upon
transfer of the property the interest rate may be raised, the clause should be
enforced." 8 However, where the lender's sole concern is raising the interest
rate on a transfer, the clause should not be enforced when it provides no notice
of this intent." 4 Without economic considerations to justify the restraint on
interest penalty is another reason to question any risk existing on the part of the lender.
See, e.g., FLA. Jun. FoaMs §5:61 (1975). However, savings and loans are prohibited from
charging a prepayment fee in conjunction with the use of a due-on-sale clause. 12 C.F.R.
§541.6-11(g)(2) (1979).
109. See, e.g., Tucker v. Lassen Say. &Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 637, 526 P.2d 1169, 1173,
116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1974); La Sala v. American Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 880-81 &
n.16, 489 P.2d 1113, 1124-25 &n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 859-60 &n.17 (1971).
110. The use of the clauses helps to equalize mortgage interest rates between old
borrowers and new buyers. If buyers were allowed to assume mortgages at a low interest
rate - one below current market value - buyers seeing new financing would be charged higher
rates to make up the economic loss to the lender. Interview with Vince Elhilow, Senior Vice
President, Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan, in West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978). The
Crockett case adopted this argument stressing, however, the fact that the mortgage being
litigated contained no prepayment penalty. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289
N.C. 620, 625, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976).

111. Obviously the availability of a lower interest mortgage for a potential buyer to
assume makes the property easier to sell. Also, the necessity for the borrower to be free
to sell his property without the consent of the lender is evident when circumstances such as
a change in employment or the need for ready cash for sudden expenses occur. See Jurisch
v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 77C-4024 (N.D. Ill filed May 26, 1978).
112. See, e.g., Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla.
1977). In its consideration of the validity of a due-on-sale clause, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court discussed some traditional rules for the interpretation and enforcement of contracts.
The court strictly construed the clause involved in that case, because it was a form contract
and had been prepared by an experienced party. Id.
113. See Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 405, 545 P.2d
546, 549 (1976).
114. See First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300, 303 (Ala. Civ. App.
1977). Contra, Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979). In ,Tierce, the majority of a
divided court overruled Britton, holding that the clause was not per se invalid and that use of
the clause solely to increase interest rates was ordinarily not inequitable.
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alienation imposed by the due-on-sale clause, the relevant inquiry would be
11
whether the protection of the lender's security will be impaired. 5
A final consideration is the impact that consistency as to the validity or
invalidity of the due-on-sale clause has on the stability of real estate titles.""
Arguably, a title examiner should be able to reasonably predict whether a
restraint will be enforced and, therefore, the clause should be per se valid."-However, if the clause were found to be per se invalid, then giving only prospective effect to the court's decision would preserve the stability of titles." s
In any event, the due-on-sale clause should have little or no effect on the
stability of titles. As a practical matter, the encumbrance on the real property
remains valid whether the clause is enforceable or not. Generally, any uncertainty which is caused by the evaluation of the due-on-sale clause as reasonable under the circumstances could easily be eliminated. If lenders drafted
their clauses explicitly stating the conditions under which the clause will be
exercised, the confusion caused by the search for the proper factors to evaluate the validity of the due-on-sale clause will be lessened. Most of the clauses
as presently worded belie their intended use, i.e., to increase the interest rate
on sale.
Obviously, a number of complex and competing interests are involved
in a court's consideration of the validity of the exercise of the due-on-sale
clause. Despite these important interests, only a few states have enacted legislation concerning the use of the clauses."19 The remaining state legislatures
have apparently been content to leave the matter in the hands of the courts.
Because of the tremendous uncertainty surrounding the legal validity of the
due-on-sale clause, in view of the possible application of the federal preemption
doctrine any legislation should be adopted with great caution.
115. See id. at 303-04. The Alabama court refused to enforce a due-on-sale clause finding
that the wording of the clause gave no indication that the financial interest of the lender
could be the sole basis for exercising the clause. Finding no risk from the proposed sale to
the security, the court held the clause could not be utilized. Id.
116. In its consideration of the due-on-sale clause as an invalid restraint on alienation,
the Supreme Court of Illinois viewed the stability of real estate titles as having paramount
importance. The court stated that an attorney in examining titles should be able to reasonably predict if a restraint will be enforced. Thus, the court held that the clauses were per se
valid, in order to avoid a case by case review for validity which would lead to uncertainty
of titles to property. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 In. 2d 119, 126, 533 N.E.2d
1, 5 (1975).
117. Id.
118. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 954, 582 P.2d 970, 977, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 579, 586 (1978).
119. California has enacted legislation which, for residential dwellings, prohibits the
exercise of a due-on-sale clause in certain situations. CAL. CIV. CODE §2924.6 (West Supp.
1978). Arizona has gone farther and enacted a statute that makes the exercise of a due-onsale clause an unlawful restraint on alienation, unless the security is jeopardized. Limits are
placed also on any increase in the interest rate in conjunction with such a clause. ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §3-806.01 (1974). Colorado has adopted legislation which basically limits any
increase in mortgage interest rates to 1%. In addition, acceleration of the entire indebtedness
is permitted only where the lender reasonably determines that the transferee of the property
is unable to pay the mortgage debt. COLO. REv. STAT. §58-30-165 (construed in Von Ehrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 27928 (D. Colo., filed August 21, 1978)).
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EQUITY AND DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES

As an alternative to the claim that the due-on-sale clause constitutes an
invalid restraint on alienation various equitable principles may be invoked
to prevent its enforcement. Courts of equity have historically been the final
1
arbiters of foreclosure suits120 and the protectors of the rights of mortgagors.
The exercise of a due-on-sale clause is no exception to this general rule where
the clause is evaluated solely under equitable doctrines or along with the
restraint of alienation claim.
Due-on-Sale Clausesas
Unconscionable or as Penalties
In a series of cases in Florida, 12

Arizona,124 and Arkansas' 25 courts of

equity have refused automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in certain
situations' 28 In a Florida case, Clark v. Lachenmeier,"27 a foreclosure action
by the mortgagee was based on the alleged breach by the mortgagor of a
mortgage provision which stated that in the event of transfer of ownership

of the encumbered property: "Mortgagee has the right and privilege- of
accepting or rejecting or passing on the credit, etc. of such successor in
ownership... ,,12s However, the mortgagee failed to allege any impairment of

security or to voice any objection to the transfer.2 The Second District Court
of Appeal recognized that prior Florida law allowed for acceleration of the
debt upon default of conditions directed to preservation of the security. 130
Additionally, the court stated that a court of equity may refuse to foreclose a
mortgage when acceleration of the debt would be unconscionable.' 31 The court

then refused foreclosure because of the lack of harm to, or depletion of, the
120. J. POMEROY, A TREATsE oN EoQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §240, at 450 (Symons rev. ed. 1941).
121. Note, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 Arm. L. REv. 485, 488 (1973).
122. Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977).
123. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970).
124. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), cert. denied,
108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972).
125. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
126. See, e.g., Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970). In Clark the
court refused foreclosure despite the failure to obtain the mortgagee's consent to transfer
the encumbered property in accordance with a due-on-sale clause. Id. at 584.
127. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970).
128. Id, at 584.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 584-85. In Florida, relief has been sought and granted from accelerations
declared for technical violations of the mortgage agreement. Courts of equity are concerned
with the consequences of enforcing the acceleration provision. See Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 584, 586 (1975). Unfortunately,
there are no concrete principles or rules concerning an acceleration clause being unreasonable
or harsh other than the "equities" of the particular case. See Lieberbaum v. Surfcomber
Hotel Corp., 122 So. 2d 28, 29-30 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1960). See also Campbell v. Werner, 232
So. 2d 252, 256-57 (ala. 3d D.C.A. 1970) where the court listed some of the situations in
which relief from acceleration provisions was granted.
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security and held that a consent clause to transfer property was not a ground
132
for acceleration when no harm resulted to the mortgagee from the sale.
The doctrine of equitable relief was also applied by an Arizona Court of
Appeals in Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Ham, 33 in which the defendants
executed a mortgage and a note to a mortgage company, both of which
contained due-on-sale clauses." 4 The two instruments were later assigned to
the plaintiff insurance company. Subsequently, the land was sold to a third
party and the plaintiff accelerated the debt and initiated foreclosure proceedings. 13 5 The court focused on the equitable concept of enforcing a penalty or a
forfeiture. 136 As in Clark, the court regarded the due-on-sale clause as intended
by both parties to deter the mortgagor from making a transfer that would impair the mortgagee's security. 137 Because the mortgagee would not risk a loss,
the court in Ham refused to enforce the clause." 8
The decisions of the courts in Clark and Ham were followed by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Tucker v. Pulaski FederalSavings & Loan Association."39 The defendant, Tucker, had executed a mortgage containing a due-onsale clause. 140 After he asked for but was refused,' 4' the consent of the mortgagee to transfer the encumbered property, the defendant sold the property. The
mortgagee sued, claiming breach of the due-on-sale clause and requesting
foreclosure.' 4 2 Reversing the automatic enforcement of the clause by the trial
court, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that equity would prevent acceleration based on inequitable conduct. 143 Emphasizing the importance of showing
an impairment of security, the court required a demonstration of legitimate
grounds before a lender could impose the burden of acceleration.14 The court
denied foreclosure 1 45 because there was no impairment of security nor reasonable grounds for not accepting the new transferee. 46 Nonetheless, transfer of
132. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970).
133. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971).
134. Id. at 79-80, 486 P.2d at 191-92.
135. Id. Part of the opinion dealt with the contention that the due-on-sale clause was
a restraint on alienation. It apparently followed the Coast Bank rationale that reasonable
restraints on alienation are per se valid. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
136. The court's reasoning was that the substance of the agreement was to prevent the
mortgagee's security from being jeopardized. Lacking such a showing, an extreme penalty
would be placed on the borrower. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
140. Id. at 849-50, 481 S.W.2d at 726.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 853, 481 S.W.2d at 728. The court in Pulaski relied on the Harn decision concerning the possibility of the imposition of a penalty if there was no legitimate basis for
enforcement of the clause. Id. at 853-54, 481 S.W.2d at 728-29.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 858, 481 S.W.2d at 730-31. The dissent contended that all that was required
of the lender was that he act in good faith in using the clause. rd. at 861, 481 S.W.2d at
737 (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
146. The court appeared to approve of the idea of "moral" waste as grounds for enforcement of the clause. Id. at 855, 481 S.W.2d at 729. See generally Comment, supra note 131.
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the property to a person who was either a poor credit risk or had a record of
allowing property to deteriorate would probably constitute an impairment. 7
A number of cases, involving the validity of the due-on-sale clause in
which equitable principles were considered, have rejected the limitations imposed by the three preceding cases. 43 While containing no common rationale,
the underlying theme of these decisions is that the clause is a valid contract
term."49
For example, in Stith v. Hudson City Savings Institution-5o a New York
appellate court found that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause was not a
forfeiture or a penalty. The court viewed the clause as a traditional acceleration provision, designed to protect the mortgagee and his security.' 5 ' The
Supreme Court of Tennessee found a due-on-sale clause to be per se valid in
Gunther v. White.15 2 The clause was considered a valid contract provision.
However, the court went on to justify the use of the clause by utilizing the
economic grounds previously discussed.'15
Other EquitableDefenses
54
In Mutual FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire Works,

the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the enforceable use of a due-on-sale
clause is dependent on the particular fact situation and whether the invocation
of the acceleration clause would be inequitable under the circumstances. 155
The court recognized a broad type of equitable balancing to prevent or allow
enforcement of acceleration clauses.

56

One important aspect of the case was

the consideration by the court of the right of the borrower to utilize the

equitable defense of laches in resisting the acceleration, although this idea
was ultimately rejected. 57 Such a defense could be important since, unlike
147. 252 Ark. at 855, 481 S.W.2d at 729.
148. See, e.g., Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675,
678-79, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585-86 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
149. See Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Tenn. 1973).
150. 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
151. Id. at 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 808. In People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., 22 Ohio
App. 2d 35, 38, 257 N.E.2d 406, 407-08 (1970), the court reached a result similar to that
reached in Stith. The due-on-sale clause under consideration was determined to be valid on
equitable grounds. The court's rationale for its holding was the right of the mortgagee to
protect its security. Id.
152. 489 S.W.2d 529, 529 (Tenn. 1973).
153. Id. at 532.
154. 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
155. Id. at 540, 239 N.W.2d at 24. It is important to note that the mortgage in Wire
Works secured a commercial loan between two corporations in contrast to the more usual
home finance loan. Id. at 533, 239 N.W.2d at 21. When a commercial o rsophisticated borrower
is involved, it appears that a court will be more willing to enforce the clause. See id. See also
Note, Mortgages- Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender is Not a Restraint on Alienation
in North Carolina, 55 N.C. L. Rnv. 310, 315 (1977).
156. Among the factors balanced were: (1) laches, (2) rising interest rates, and (3) impairment of security. 71 Wis. 2d at 538, 239 N.W.2d at 23. This type of test appears to
represent an uneasy compromise between the economic interests of lenders and the freedom
of alienation interest of borrowers.
157. Id. at 538, 239 N.W.2d at 23-24. The mortgagor sought to base a laches defense on
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some acceleration clauses, the due-on-sale clause is not self-executing; that is,
58
the option must be exercised before the provision becomes effective.
The traditional equitable defenses of waiver, estoppel, bad faith, and fraud
would also seem to be applicable to the due-on-sale clause. 59 Waiver of the
acceleration could be a viable defense when a mortgagee accepts payments
from the new buyer at the old rate and only subsequently attempts to accelerate.1 60 Estoppel could occur when the lender first approves of a transfer or
remains silent, and then repudiates the sale and accelerates after the borrowerseller has relied upon the apparent consent.- 1 Finally, a general claim by the
borrower of inequitable conduct on the part of the lender might be utilized
when the lender seeks to raise the interest rate excessively through use of a
due-on-sale clause'62 or when he seeks to obtain collateral benefits such as
"transfer fees" for a waiver of the clause's enforcement.,'
Due-on-Sale Clauses as Unconscionable Contracts or Clauses
The typical due-on-sale clause may be misleading to borrowers because it
does not put the mortgagor on notice that the lender may have the right to
raise the interest charge when the property is transferred.'6 ' Lack of notice to
the typical mortgagor concerning the true effect of the clause could exacerbate
the inherently unequal bargaining power between the institutional lender
and the ordinary borrower. 65 An unconscionability defense against the operaconstructive notice to the mortgagee of the sale of the property to a third party. This
notice was allegedly provided by the recording of the land sale contract. Id. at 538, 239
N.W.2d at 23.
158. See Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 210,
216, 223 N.W.2d 921, 924 (1974). In that case, a laches defense was successful. The court also
applied the equitable balancing test described in Wire Works. Id. at 215-20, 223 N.W.2d at
924-26.
159. First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 365, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976).
160. See Medovi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 3d 317, 133 Cal. Rptr. 63,
68-69 (1976). In Medovi, waiver was argued by the seller and was considered to be a viable
defense by the court. However, it was ultimately rejected on the facts of that case. Id.
161. See Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 442-43,
553 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1976). The court stated that estoppel was a good defense to the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause, but that the facts in that case did not support it. Id.
162. In the Baker case, the court stated that raising the interest rate to a level 1%
above the old rate was reasonable and not inequitable. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 126-27, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
163. In Fetter, the lender attempted to exercise a due-on-sale clause upon the seller's
refusal to pay a fee to the lender after the sale of the property. The court refused to
enforce the clause on this basis. 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977). In La Sala, the court refused to enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause when the lender's security was not impaired
and the lender wanted to exact collateral benefits from the borrower, i.e., excessive waiver
fees. 5 Cal. 3d at 880-81 & n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123-24 & n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 & n.17.
164. See First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300, 303-04 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1977). The intent by the lender to use the clause to increase the rate of interest on
transfer would probably be unknown to the average borrower who would in most instances
assume the clause is only to provide protection for the security. Id.
165. It is unlikely that the average borrower is in a position to bargain with the lender.
He is likely to think that the only way for him to receive the loan is to agree to the
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tion of a due-on-sale clause by a borrower might be tenable.166 An unconscionability standard is a commonly used device for judicial policing of commercial
transactions. 16 7 For example, in the LaSala case, an allegation was made that
the mortgages which contained due-on-encumbrance clauses were contracts of
adhesion or unconscionable. 68
While an unconscionability defense is possible, it seems unlikely to be
accepted by most courts. One possible reason for the limited use of an adhesion contract defense is that many of the due-on-sale clause decisions involved
commercial or sophisticated borrowers.'9 Also, most courts appear reluctant to
apply the adhesion contract theory.Y'0 However, it remains an important
contention in any equitable argument and, given the number of jurisdictions
which use balancing tests to determine the validity of the due-on-sale clause,,
it should be an influential factor.171
FLORDA, LAW

The contention that a due-on-sale clause is an invalid restraint on alienation
has never been squarely presented before a Florida court. Nevertheless, some
basic principles indicate the position which the Florida judiciary may adopt.
In other jurisdictions, it appears that the reasonableness of the restraint caused
by the due-on-sale clause is critical. 72 Existing Florida case law appears to have
adopted a variant of the "reasonableness" test in evaluating the validity of
a restraint on alienation, through use of a two-part analysis. 7 3- The overall
purpose of the Florida test is apparently to preclude unlimited or absolute
restraints on alienation.174 First, the courts consider the duration of the restraint, the type of alienation that is prevented, and the class precluded from
taking 7 5 Second, the courts consider the reasonableness of the restraint by
standard terms. Interview with Doris L. Wisner, Mortgage Loan Officer for the Lewis State
Bank, in Tallahassee (Sept. 15, 1978).
166. See generally, Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for
Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1109 (1975).
167. See Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy. Cm.
L.J. 765, 765 (1978).
168. On remand, the California Supreme Court ordered the trial court to consider the
unconscionability defense which it had previously dismissed. La Sala v. American Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d at 876, 489 P.2d at 1120, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
169. See, e.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. at 224 S.E.2d at 589
(Lake, J., dissenting); People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus. Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d at 35-36,
257 N.E.2d at 407.
170. See Note, Consumer Protection in Florida: Inadequate Legislative Treatment of
Consumer Fraud, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 528, 529 (1971).
171. See, e.g., Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d
210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974) (application of a test requiring a balancing of the equities).
172. See, e.g., Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 ,Viss. 1975). In that case, the court explicitly adopted a balancing test of "reasonableness under the circumstances" to determine
the validity of due-on-sale clauses. Id. at 64.
173. See, e.g., Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961).
174. See Davis v. Geyer, 151 Fla. 362, 369, 9 So. 2d 727, 729 (1942) ; Seagate Condo. Ass'n
v. Duffy, 880 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
175. Seagate Condo. Ass'n v. Duffy, 30 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Fla. 4th D.C,A. 1976). Applica-
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weighing its social utility against the impairment of the individual's freedom
to convey. 176 Because of the uncertain nature of this test, no firm conclusion
can be reached on the general validity of the due-on-sale clause.
Despite the paucity of Florida case or statutory law directly concerning
the due-on-sale clause as a restraint on alienation, Clark v. Lachenmeier is the
forefront case developing an equitable approach to the validity of the due-onsale clause. 17 7 The court, as previously discussed, held that proof of harm to
78
the mortgagee must exist before a due-on-sale clause would be enforced.
However, the decision was that of a district court of appeal, and there has
been no subsequent analysis of the equitable test announced therein. While
implicit approval has been given by the Florida Supreme Court to the Clark
case, 79 this position is by no means certain.
The next Florida case to construe the due-on-sale clause was Home Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. English. 0° The opinion of the district court
was ambiguous, but basically required a strict literal satisfaction of the terms
of the due-on-sale clause before it could be enforced.' 8 ' The decision achieved
the same result as Clark, non-enforcement of the clause, but without expressly
8 2
following the reasoning of that decision.
An analogous case, Stockman v. Burke1 3 was a Second District Court of
Appeal case involving a suit on a promissory note rather than a mortgage
foreclosure. The court held that the note, secured by a mortgage
containing a due-on-sale clause, allowed acceleration upon transfer of the
property under an incorporation by reference theory.1 4 The court did not
tion of these rather limited and strict requirements would not appear to be violated by
the typical due-on-sale clause.
176. Id. at 486-87.
177. See text accompanying notes 130-135 supra.
178. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970). The clause in
Clark did not provide for acceleration of the debt upon a breach of the covenant's provisions.
Nevertheless, subsequent case law interpreting the Clark decision has ignored this factor.
Report of the Subcommittee on "Due-on" Clauses of the Committee on Real Estate Financing,
Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 905 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Report on "Due-on" Clauses].
179. See Delgado v. Strong, 360 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1978). In Delgado, the Clark decision
was favorably cited to support the proposition: "It is well-established that courts of equity
may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the due date would render
the acceleration unconscionable and the result would be inequitable and unjust." Id.
180. 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971).
181. The court held that because of the conjunctive wording of the mortgage two
conditions were needed for a valid acceleration. First, the conveyance must not be made
without the written consent of the mortgagee. Second, an invalid assumption of the
mortgage indebtedness must occur. Because the mortgage had in fact been assumed, although
without consent, the court denied acceleration for failure to meet the second condition.
Id. at 709.
182. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, for failure to
alleged impairment of security, but did not consider this ground as the basis for its
decision. Id. at 708-09.
183. 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
184. The court stated that the terms of the mortgage, including the due-on-sale clause,
became part of the terms of the note. This was because the two were executed contemporaneously and referred to each other. Id. at 90.
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apply equitable principles to the clause, and left open the question of whether
the mortgage could be accelerated and foreclosed upon sale of the property
without a showing of impairment of the security.85
As illustrated by Stockman, due-on-sale clause enforcement by suit on the
note at law may be more expeditious than mortgage foreclosure in which the
equitable considerations of the Clark decision can be raised. This would be
especially so if the courts were to determine that section 671.208, Florida
Statutes (U.C.C. § 1-208) governed the use of the clause, because it restricts
the exercise of an acceleration provision only where the borrower can establish the lender's lack of good faith." 6 The problem is that the U.C.C.
generally does not apply to real estate transactions.18 7 Nevertheless, a mortgage
note might be subject to section 1-208 because that section applies to every
U.C.C. article including those applicable to notes. s8 In the Arkansas Pulaskz
Federal opinion, the dissent's argument was that Section 1-208 should be a
governing factor. 8 9 However, this view was explicitly rejected by a majority
of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Crockett case previously
mentioned. The Crockett court determined that Section 1-208 was drafted
to cover "at will" or "insecurity" acceleration clauses, whereas the typical
due-on-sale clause is more of a default clause predicated upon the occurrence
of a certain event.190 Thus, the applicability of section 1-208 remains open
to question.' 9'
In Florida, the next analogous case to arise concerning the due-on-sale
clause was Chopan v. Klinkman,12 a Fourth District Court of Appeal case. In
185. The court's opinion distinguished Clark on the basis that Stockman involved a suit
at law on a promissory note, while "Clak was an equitable proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage. Id.
186. Section 1-208 of the U.C.C. states: "A term providing that one party or his successor
in interest may accelerate payment or performance . . .'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure' or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have
power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance
is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the
power has been exercised." U.C.C. §1-208 (1972 version) (emphasis added).
187. The U.C.C. is limited to dealings in personal property. Id. §§2-106, 9-104().
188. Id. §8-104.
189. The dissenter in Pulaski was of the view that the lender was limited in his
exercise of a due-on-sale clause only by the good faith described in U.C.C. §1-208. 252 Ark.
at 861, 481 S.W.2d at 782 (Fogelman, J., dissenting). Section 1-208 has been held applicable
to an acceleration provision in a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real property.
Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 201, 202-08, 488 S.W.2d 479, 480, aff'd on rehearing on other grounds,
246 Ark. 627, 628, 438 S.W.2d 479, 481 (1969). The court in Seay stated, without articulating
its reasoning, that an acceleration provision in a note was within the scope and intent of
§1-208. Id. However, in a situation in which the acceleration clause is found in the mortgage
only, it is doubtful that any court would find the U.C.C. to be more than persuasive
authority.
190. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. &'Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 628, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588
(1976).
191. Nevertheless, one could argue that the typical due-on-sale clause which is not selfexecuting, is enforceable at the option of the mortgagee and thus is similar to the "at will"
clause covered by §1-208. See Walker Bank & Trust Co, v,Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 3883, 385, 490
P.2d 328, 829 (1971).
192. 380 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
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Chopan the lender was attempting to exercise a due-on-sale clause upon the
sale of the property by an agreement for deed. 193 The court held that the agreement for deed did not constitute a sale within the meaning of that particular
clause. 9 4 The court's rationale was that a court of equity required a showing
of a clear and unequivocal right to accelerate. 195
A 1980 Second District Court of Appeal decision, which is discussed in a
subsequent section,96 has injected a new element into the Florida due-on-sale
clause controversy, the claim that federal law governs the validity and
exercise of the clause by federal savings institutions. In addition, the 1980
Florida legislature passed legislation which indirectly regulates the use of the
clause by state savings institutions.-9 In general, therefore, despite the one
concrete use of the equitable approach in Clark, the validity of the due-on-sale
clause in Florida remains unsettled.298
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW BY FEDERAL LAW

Controversy concerning the use by federal lending institutions"" of the
due-on-sale clause may be resolved by operation of the federal preemption
doctrine.2 0 0 Arguably, Congress has preempted state law concerning the clauses
through the issuance of regulations governing the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), pursuant to its
congressionally delegated authority.20 ' Even if these regulations do not warrant
invocation of the preemption doctrine, preemption may occur upon general
federalism principles.

20

2

Federal savings and loans are chartered, organized, and operated under
193. Id. at 154-55.
194. Id. at 156.
195. Id.
196. See text accompanying notes 264-271 infra.
197. See text accompanying notes 272-274 infra.
198. Two influential groups in the property area, attorneys and realtors, have indirectly expressed their disapproval of the due-on-sale clause. In the uniform contract
promulgated by The Florida Bar and Florida Association of Realtors, the use of the dueon-sale clause in a purchase money mortgage given by the buyer to the seller has been
prohibited. The Florida Bar and the Florida Association of Realtors Contract For Sale and
Purchase, Standard C, (1975).
199. In Florida, it is estimated that 60 to 70% of the home loans are made by federal
savings and loans with the balance supplied by mortgage companies and state banks. Interview with Christopher Cook, Counsel for Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association, in
West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978).
200. The doctrine of federal preemption is derived from the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. U. S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
201. 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(g) (1979).
202. See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. Se Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1974). When preemption applies, state law is inapplicable to issues which arise in the
preempted area. A specific regulation can suspend state law. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350 (1943). Preemption may also occur by implication from the nature and subject matter
of the congressional legislation. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947). See generally Comment, The Due-on Clause: A Preemption
Controversy, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 629, 631 (1977).
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the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933. 203 This Act established the FHLBB
which has supervisory and regulatory authority over these associations.-4 In
May of 1976, the FHLBB promulgated a regulation effective July 31, 1976,
which authorized the use of due-on-sale clauses by federal associations with
certain limitations.-s Promulgation of this regulation may have preempted
state law concerning the due-on-sale clause.
ProceduralProblems
Both the lender and the borrower have an interest in which court, state
or federal, derides the preemption issue.20° The lender would perceive a
federal court as the one more attuned to its concerns since it would be more
predisposed to invoke the federal preemption doctrine. 'On the other hand, the
borrower would be likely to consider a state forum more desirable, as a state
court usually would be more inclined to apply favorable state law instead of
utilizing the preemption doctrine.
The unreported decision of Jurisch v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings
& Loan Association,20 7 which concerned the proper forum for a borrower's
challenge of a due-on-sale clause, is illustrative 'of the procedural problems
which will arise in preemnption litigation regarding the law governing the dueon-sale clause. In Jurisch, the plaintiff was seeking a state forum for his claims
that the due-on-sale was unconscionable and a restraint on alienation. Simultaneously, the defendanE sought the removal of the case to a federal court,
claiming that state law had been preempted. The federal district court held
that the preemption issue was a defense only, and that a federal court lacked
jurisdiction since the plaintiff's case was based on state law.I
A similar result was reached by the federal district court in California
v.
GlendaleFederalSavings & Loan Association.*9 The state of California sought
203. 12 US.C. §§1461-1468 (1976).
204. 12 U.S.C. §1464(a), (d) (1976).
205. 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(g) (1979). The regulation provides in part: "A Federal Association continues to have the power to include .'. a provision in its loan instrument whereby
the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable all the sums secured
by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing
the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's written prior
consent . . . [and] exercise by an association of such an acceleration option . -.. shall be
governed exclusively by the terms of the contract . . . and all rights and remedies . . .
thereto shall be fixed and governed by said contract." Id. §545.6-11(f). Among the exceptions
to the operation of the clause are: creation of a subordinate encumbrance, transfer upon
death, or a lease for less than three years if there is no option to purchase. Id. §545.6-11(g).
As a matter of policy, certain family transfers or hardship cases may constitute exceptions.
Id. §556.9(c). In addition, the FHLBB expects the increase in the interest rate that may be
made to be to the prevailing rate and not in excess of it. !d. §556.9(d). Finally, the clause
cannot be exercised in conjunction with a prepayment penalty. Id. §54 5.6-11(g)(2).
206. In Jurisch v, Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 77C-4024 (N.D. IlL.,
filed May 26, 1978) and Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill.
1979), both of the borrowers challenging due-on-sale clauses sought a state court forum,
while both'federal lenders desired a federal forum.
207. No. 77C-4024 (N.D. Ill., filed May 26, 1978).
208. Id. at 5-7.
209. 475 F. Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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an injunction under state law against a federal lender's exercise of due-onsale clauses. The FHLBB was allowed to intervene in the action. The suit
was removed to federal district court, but the plaintiff sought to have the
action remanded to state court. The district court held that the defense of
federal preemption did not create federal jurisdiction, where the plaintiff's
complaint was based on state law. 210 In addition, the court determined that
the intervention of the FHLBB was not a sufficient basis for creating federal
jurisdiction.2 1 ' However, on nearly identical facts, the federal district court
in Bailey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association21 2 determined that the
court did have jurisdiction. The borrower in Bailey was resisting the removal
to federal district court of his state law challenge of a due-on-sale clause. The
district court determined that the complaint disclosed a controversy in an
area in which federal law had preempted state law and therefore, a federal
question was implicit in the complaint. 21' The reasoning of the court in
Bailey can be criticized on two grounds. First, while ostensibly ruling upon a
procedural issue its language involves what is tantamount to a decision on the
merits of the case, i.e., state law has been preempted by federal law. 2 Second,
2 5
it is against the weight of authority.
Assuming that the Jurisch reasoning will be followed, a borrower may
demand a state court hearing when he brings an action to invalidate a dueon-sale clause. Thus, an important tool in the borrower's selection of a favorable forum may be to quickly seek a declaratory judgment to challenge a dueon-sale clause. Several state court decisions have explicitly approved the use
of a declaratory judgment action in such instances. 210 A federal lender would
find it more beneficial, however, to bring an action in federal district court
alleging preemption of any state law relating to the clause. 21 7 It is now conceivable that a "race to the courthouse" might take place in order for a party
to obtain the desired forum.
Substantive Law Post-1976
The first decision, nationally, to squarely confront the preemption issue
was Glendale FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Fox.2 18 Several California
210. Id. at 731.
211. Id. at 733.
212. 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
213. Id. at 1141-42.
214. In Jurisch, the court had stated that the existence of preemption was by no means
clear. No. 77C-4024 at 6 (N.D. Ill., filed May 26, 1978).
215. Generally, to permit removal of a case to federal court, a federal issue must appear
in the complaint; a defense of federal preemption is not sufficient. See, e.g., Home Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Insurance Dept. of Iowa, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); Washington v.
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972); Borzello v.
Charles D. Sooy & C. Darrell Sooy, 427 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Johnson v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 418 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
216. Amos v. Norwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 47 Ill. App. 3d 643, 365 N.E.2d 57 (1977);
Holliday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 271 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1978).
217. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 906 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
218. Id.
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officials refused, pursuant to California law, to permit the lender to make
loans for a condominium development, because of the lender's use of due-onsale clauses in its mortgages. 210 The savings and loan association then sought a
declaratory judgment which would determine that federal law exclusively
&2 20
governed the validity and exercise of the clause in the association's mortgages.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California held:
"The language, history, structure, and purpose of the Home Owner's Loan
Act evidence a clear congressional intent to delegate to the Bank Board complete authority to regulate federal savings and loan associations and to preempt
state regulation."-sl
With regard to the due-on-sale clause regulations, the district court determined that the FHLBB had properly enacted regulations governing savings
and loan associations' operations. These regulations exclusively governed and
therefore preempted any state regulation- relating to due-on-sale clauses
beginning June 8, 1976.223 The court's decision in Fox, which is currently on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, is consistent with the majority of case law concerning preemption of state law by explicit FHLBB regulations. 224 Apparently,
use of this same clause by federal loan associations in their loan instruments
after July 31, 1976 is free from the strictures of state law.
Substantive Law Pre-1976
The FHLBB due-on-sale clause regulation does not appear to be retroactive
in its effect. 225 FHLBB regulations have the force and effect of statuteasO
Thus, they are subject to the general rule of statutory construction that
statutes are presumed not to operate retroactively.-7 However, preemption of
state law prior to the due-on-sale clause regulation's effective date may take
219. Id. at 906.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 910.
222. Id.
223. The district court stated that the effective date of the regulations was June 8,
1976. Id. at 904. However, the regulations refer to July 31 as the effective date. 12 C.F.R.
§545.6-11(f) (1979). No explanation was given by the court for the use of the June date.
224. See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974);
Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill.
1975); People
v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951). The holding in each of
these decisions was basically that Congress had lawfully delegated broad regulatory authority
to the FHLBB and that regulations issued pursuant to this authority preempted any related
state law.
225. The "continuing authority" language in the regulation could be-used as an argument for retroactive application, by claiming the clause has always been approved. 12 C.F.R.
§545.6-11(f) (1979). However, the existence of an effective date lends support to a prospective
application. Id. In addition, two decisions have given the regulation prospective effect only.
Bailey v. First Fed. Say. 8:Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. at 1141; Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Fox. 459 F. Supp. at 907.
226. City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (D. Wis. 1975).
227. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964). In Greene, the Court held that
an administrative regulation that interferes with antecedent rights will not be given retroactive effect, unless the intent to do so is dear and manifest.
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place by the application of another FHLBB regulation. In Fox, the contention
was made that a regulation, in effect since 1948, authorized due-on-sale clauses.
This regulation required each "loan contract" of a savings and loan to "provide for full protection to the Federal Association."' s However, the district
court explicitly refused to decide the issue.- 9 It would be unfortunate if this
vague regulation is interpreted to authorize pre-1976 due-on-sale clauses, because it is arguable whether the due-on-sale clause "protects" the federal
lender or merely serves as a revenue raising device.
Preemption may be found upon another theory, specifically by congressional "occupation of the field." Occupation of the field is a legal term of art
in the preemption area.23 0 With reference to a due-on-sale clause, it can best
be defined as an explicit or implicit congressional declaration of intent that
the states are prohibited from regulating the loan instruments of federal lending institutions. 2 3 1 In general, the case law involving preemption has recognized several factors by which an intent of Congress to occupy the field may be
identified. The most important of these factors are: (1) if the scheme of federal
regulations is so pervasive that Congress has left no room for states to act; (2)
if the field is one which the federal government is so dominant that state
action is precluded; or (3) if enforcement of state law would present serious
2
conflicts with the objectives and purposes of a congressional program.
While federal savings and loans are highly regulated, courts have differed
on whether the scheme is so pervasive as to occupy the field. Several decisions
do contain language which assert that federal law has occupied the entire field
with regard to savings and loans thus precluding any state regulation.- How234
ever, these statements were merely dicta in all but one decision.
228. 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(g) (1979).
229. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 907 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
230. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 623, 624-25 (1975).
231. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 910 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
See also Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972). In Lockheed,
preemption in the air commerce area was at issue. The court determined that whether
federal law preempts the authority of state or local government to regulate in a certain
area was a matter of congressional intent. Id. at 671.
232. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 988, 994 (1978).
233. Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974);
Greenwald v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D. Mass. 1978); Rettig v.
Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. I1. 1975); Lyons Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1974); People v.
Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Kaski v. First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367, 372 (1976). The weight, if any, to be
accorded these statements is open to question when the authority for them is examined.
Typically, a quotation from Coast Bank is relied upon for support: "The Board has adopted
comprehensive rules and regulations concerning the powers and operations of every Federal
Savings and Loan Association from its cradle to its corporate grave." 98 F. Supp. at 316.
See, e.g., Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D.
Ill. 1975).
234. Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (0th Cir. 1974); Greenwald v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass. 1978); Rettig v. Arlington
Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. IU. 1975); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n
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The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kaski v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Associationas5 provides the strongest support for the argument
of complete preemption of state law concerning savings and loan associations.
In Kaski, the plaintiff had brought an action alleging that an interest rate
escape clause was invalid under state law because it was unconscionable, vague
and indefinite.so The Kaski court stated that Congress had "substantially"
occupied the field concerning the regulation of federal lenders and'that the
scheme of federal regulation was pervasive.237 The plaintiff's action was remanded to the trial court with instructions to decide solely upon federal
law.ss Upon close examination, however, the court's broad finding of preemption should be questioned. The actual holding of the court apparently depended on its characterization of the plaintiff's action as involving an internal
affair of a federal assocation.239 In disputes involving internal affairs, courts
have found preemption of state law per se.m" However, an internal affair
usually involves a matter which relates to the control functions of the association, such as removal and replacement of officers241 or the duties of officers
and directors. 22 It would be difficult to place the due-on-sale clause in this
category. A contractual provision between the association and a third party
does not have the effect on the management of the association which the
cases involving an internal affair connote. Thus, the court's decision in Kaski
may have little precedential value concerning the preemption of state law
3
regarding the due-on-sale clause.24
In addition, the Supreme Court of Oregon reached the opposite conclusion
in regard to preemption of state law concerning federal associations in Derenco
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 877 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974); People v. Coast-Bdnk Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
On appeal, the First Circuit in Greenwald expressly refused to follow the district

court's finding that a FHLBB regulation precluded all state regulation of federal savings
and loan associations. First Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 426 n.16 (1st
Cir. 1979). The court based its preemption finding on the narrower ground of a conflict
between a specific federal regulation and state law. Id.
235. 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976).

236. The clause allowed for an increase in the interest rate of the loan, upon proper
notice. Id. at 369.
237. Id. at 372.
238. Id. at 373.

239. According to the court: "The regulation of loan practices directly affects the
internal management and operations of federal associations and therefore requires uniform
federal control." Id. at 373.
240. See, e.g., Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 826
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (fiduciary duties of directors and officers).
241. See, e.g., Pearson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 149 So. 2d 891, 894-95 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1963).
242. See, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial ed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir.
1967).
243. Washington Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Balaban, 281 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1973) contains
language similar to that in Kaski concerning the complete preemption of state law regulating
federal savings and loans. However, Balaban clearly involved an internal affair. The issue

involved the power of a state court to enjoin a federal association from attending a FHLBB
meeting. Id. at 16.
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v. FederalSavings & Loan Association.244 The fact situation in Derenco, which
involved a FHLBB regulation requiring the payment of interest on escrow
accounts, is somewhat analogous to the due-on-sale clause controversy.24 5 The
regulation was effective in 1975, and held not to be retroactive.24 6 Nonetheless,
the lender argued that state law prior to the effective date of the regulation
was preempted. The court, responding to this claim, determined that: "Neither
do we believe the field has been entirely occupied. Congress is always capable
of saying if it intends to occupy the field exclusively and so are federal regulators." 2 47

The position of the court in Derenco appears to be the most defensible.
Finding an absolute preemption of state law relating to federal savings and
loans is unnecessary to insure that the associations could continue to function
normally.2 - To allow the complete preemption, as suggested by the dicta in
some decisions, regarding items such as contracting with third parties would
2

be extreme.

49

Turning to other preemption theories, the questions of preemption due to
dominant federal interests or the conflict between state and federal programs
are largely a matter of speculation in the savings and loan area. An important,
and possibly dominant, interest could be found in the need of federal savings
and loans to exercise the clauses. Basically, a savings and loan borrows money
on a short-term basis but lends it on a long-term basis.25 If the "price" it must
pay for money goes up, to meet operation costs the "price" it receives for its
money (generally from mortgages) must be even higher.2 51 The due-on-sale
clause is a means of increasing the yield of the mortgage portfolio of the
lender, thereby leading to a profit. 25 2 When the cost of money increases sub-

stantially, such leverage may be important 253 However, there are no firm
254
statistics available to substantiate this claim.

244. Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d
477 (1978).
245. Id. at 481-82.
246. Id. at 483.
247. Id. at 487.
248. Cf. Pearson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 149 So. 2d 891, 894-95 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1963) ("It is a well-established rule that federal savings and loan associations are subject
only to state law which does not interfere with the purposes for which it was created, does
not destroy its efficiency, and does not conflict with paramount federal law.')
249. Cf. Buchanan v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 393 A.2d 704, 713 n.19 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978) (preemption in the savings and loan area of the common law of trust and contract
is highly unusual).
250. Interview with Vince Elhilow, Senior Vice President, Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan in West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978).
251. This problem is termed disintermediation. It can be illustrated by the use of
high yield investment certificates with interest rates of 10% or higher while there may be
mortgages with interest yields of only 7%. Kratovil, A New Dilemna for Thrift Institutions:
Judicial Emasculation of the Due-on-Sale Clause, 12 J. MARSH. J.299, 311-12 (1979).
252. Letter from Jerome S. Plapinger, Associate General Counsel, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, to Brian O'Connell (July 18, 1978).
253. Interview with Christopher Cook, Counsel for Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan in
West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978).
254. In several areas of Florida, mortgage rates are not being raised on sale of the
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Additional conflict between state law and important federal interests
may occur in the operation of the secondary mortgage market.2 55 This is the
process by which state and federal associations sell mortgages to increase their
cash flow. 2 56 If state law governed due-on-sale clauses and limited their operation, loans would be less marketable since the primary agencies in the secondary market require the clause to be in loans which they purchase.2 57 Therefore,
savings and loans would suffer a loss in revenue, forcing them to alter their
operations.
These arguments, however, are vulnerable to a criticism raised in the
Derenco case. There the court found that: "[W]e do not believe that preemption occurs simply because under some imaginable set of economic facts the
application of state law could impede the efficient execution of a federal
statutory purpose." 258 Thus, the burden should appropriately be placed on
the federal savings and loans to justify, either in terms of economic or banking
policy, the need for exercising due-on-sale clauses. With the average life for
a loan being seven years, 259 at which time it must be refinanced at the prevailing interest rate, it might not be possible for the associations to meet this
burden.
In any event, several principles should be considered in resolving the preemption issue for due-on-sale clauses executed prior to 1976. The Supreme
Court has held that conflicts between state and federal law are not to be
sought out.260 This policy would militate in favor of allowing state law to
continue to apply to pre-1976 due-on-sale clauses. Another consideration is
that at the time the loan was made the expectations of the parties, if any,
would have been that state law was to apply2 61 The tendency of the present
62
Supreme Court to accommodate state and federal law should also be noted.2
Finally, the lack of retroactivity of the due-on-sale regulation and the silence
of the FHLBB on the subject 2 3 support a requirement that a convincing
showing be made by the federal associations if preemption is to occur for
pre-1976 due-on-sale clauses.
property, as is the case in states such as California; yet, these institutions continue to
function normally. Interview with Adam G. Adams, II, Counsel for Duval Federal Savings
and Loan Association in Jacksonville, Florida (Sept. 22, 1978).
255. See 12 U.S.C. §§1716-1723(d) (1976).
256. Id.
257. Interview with Adam G. Adams, II, Counsel for Duval Federal Savings and Loan
Association in Jacksonville (Sept. 22, 1978).
577 P.2d
258. Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, -,
477, 483 (1978).
259. Interview with Vince Elhilow, Senior Vice President, Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Association in West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978).
260. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 85, 45 (1966).
261. In Florida, as well as in other jurisdictions, federal lenders' due-on-sale clauses
have been litigated under state law without any claim of preemption being raised. See, e.g.,
Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. English, 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971).
262. Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 577 P.2d at 487.
263. See Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 719 (E.D. Pa.
1963). In evaluating a preemption argument, the court held that more than silence of the
regulations would be required to overcome a common law right. Id.
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FloridaLaw
In First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lockwood, 26 4 the Second
District Court of Appeal was urged to apply the FHLBB's due-on-sale clause
regulation to a mortgage executed before 1976. Apparently assuming the regulation to be retroactive, the court nevertheless determined that the regulation
established no procedure for the enforcement of the clause. 2 5 Therefore, a
state court foreclosure action remains necessary to enforce the due-on-sale
clause, and this action would continue to be subject to state law equitable
restrictions. 266 As a result of the Lockwood case, a federal lender will be required to prove an impairment of its security in order for the clause to be
2
enforced. 67
Several observations can be made concerning the Lockwood decision.
First, as previously discussed, the due-on-sale clause regulation does not
purport to apply to mortgages executed prior to 1976.26s Second, the district
court's finding that the FHLBB regulation has no effect on the procedure
for enforcing a due-on-sale clause is not entirely certain. In general, state law
governs foreclosure actions brought by federal savings and loans.269 State law
would also apply to the interpretation of a particular due-on-sale clause.270
While it can be argued that the due-on-sale clause regulation is subject to
state law equitable principles, 271 the intent of the drafters of the regulation
was to provide for automatic enforcement of the clauses.2 72 The regulation
itself states that the "exercise" of the clause by a federal lender and "all rights
and remedies" of the parties are governed "exclusively" by the terms of the
264. No.79-2124 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. filed May 16, 1980).
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 7. In effect, the Lockwood decision is a reaffirmation of Clark v. Lachenmeier.
However, the rationale for the court's decision in Lockwood was more explicit. The district
court found no notice in the due-on-sale clause which would alert the borrower to its
possible use as a revenue raising device. Ikd. at 8 nn.7, 8. Without such notice, the court
viewed the use of the clause as being limited to the protection of the lender's security. Id. at
5-6. Overall, the Lockwood court placed little emphasis on the preemption issue, primarily
drawing upon state case law where federal preemption was not involved.
268. The regulation provides that "with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976,"
the use of the clause is to be governed solely by the loan contract. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)
(1979).
269. See West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Roll, No. 77-1309, Slip Op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jul. 19, 1977) (foreclosure of real estate mortgage is ordinarily an action based solely on
state law); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Zequeira, 288 F. Supp. 384, 387 Q.P.R. 1968)
(validity, effect and construction of a mortgage lien is determined by the law of the state
in which the mortgaged property is located).
270. See notes 281-282 and accompanying text, infra.
271. Cf. Ricks v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1262, 1265-67 (S.D. Ga. 1976). Ricks involved an equitable action by a mortgagor to enjoin a mortgage foreclosure brought by the
Small Business Association, a federal agency. The issue in the case was whether federal
common law applied rather than state statutes which protected the mortgagor. The district
court held that the determination of whether state or federal law would apply was to be
made by examining the loan documents to ascertain the intent of the parties. Id.
272. 41 Fed. Reg. 18286, 18287 (1976).
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mortgage.273 Thus, the substance-procedure interpretation 274 of the FHLBB
regulation utilized by the Lockwood court may be criticized as creating an
artificial distinction concerning the meaning of the regulation. Without
automatic enforcement, the application of the clause is effectively limited,
contrary to the language of the due-on-sale clause regulation. On the other
hand, the FHLBB regulation may not be sufficiently explicit to negate the
75
usual application of state law to a foreclosure proceeding.
In an apparent response to the due-on-sale clause preemption problem, the
Florida legislature enacted a 1980 statutory amendment pertaining to the use
of the clause by state savings and loan associations. The new statute prohibits
the use of a due-on-sale clause by state lenders if federal lenders in Florida
"lose the right to include such a provision in a real estate loan contract. 27
In the absence of a change in the FHLBB regulations, it is doubtful that a
federal association would ever lose the right to merely place such, a clause
278
in a mortgage.27 7 Therefore, the statute may never become operative.
PROBLETS IN THE USE AND EXERCISE OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES

Utilizing the example of the typical due-on-sale controversy given in the
introduction,279 an application of the law previously discussed will be made.
In addition, some new issues will be considered with the purpose of aiding
273.

12 C.F.R. §,545.6-11(f) (1979).

274. In Lockwood, the district court of appeal stated that the validity of the FHLBB
regulation and its authorization of the due-on-sale clause was an 'issue which was independent of the procedures governing the enforcement of the clause. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lockwood, Slip Op. at 6.
275. See Home Owners' Loan Corp. v.-Wilkes, 130 Fla. 492, 498, 178 So. 161, 163 (1938)
(in a mortgage foreclosure action, a federal savings and loan association has the same status
as any other mortgagee). Cf, United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 251-54 (6th Cir. 1979). A
state law defense was asserted by a borrower in Willis against a collection suit brought by
the Small Business Association. The government claimed that the guaranty executed by the
borrower was absolutely enforceable and was governed solely by federal law. The Sixth
Circuit agreed that the guaranty was subject only to federal law because of the wording of
a specific regulation and the language of the guaranty. However, in fashioning a federal
common law rule to apply to the case, the relevant state law was made the federal rule.
One argument used by the government to resist the adoption of state law was a loss of
uniformity needed for the smooth functioning of the Small Business Association. A similar
policy argument is likely to be raised concerning the application of state law to federal
lenders' use of the due-on-sale clause. See text accompanying notes 250-257 supra.
276. Fla. S.348, §42 (Reg. Sess. 1980, to be codified as 665.073(8)).
277. There is no apparent basis for invalidating the FHLBB regulation which approves
of federal lenders' inclusion of due-on-sale clauses in their mortgages. Even the Lockwood
case explicitly avoided this issue. First Fed. Say. & TLoan Ass'n v. Lockwood, Slip. Op. at 6.
278. The statute has no immediate effect. The use of a due-on-sale clause is simply prohibited on the occurence of a certain contingency. Accordingly, the little existing case law
will presumably continue to govern the use of the clause by state lending institutions. In
addition, the statute does not seem to be retroactive and would therefore apply only to
those mortgages executed after its effective date. See Foley v. Morris, 339 So. 2d 215, 216-17
(Fla. 1976) (in Florida, statutes are presumed not to operate retroactively unless the contrary
intent is specifically stated).
279. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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the practitioner in handling a due-on-sale clause problem. Initially, the lender's
status as a federal lending institution needs to be established.28 0 If a non-federal
lender is involved, the state law discussed earlier will control. Assuming a
federal lender is involved, the preemption problem needs to be confronted,
along with the choice of forum consideration. Whether the mortgage was
executed prior or subsequent to July 1976 will then determine which preemption cases should be consulted.
Regardless of the time of the execution of the mortgage or the nature of
the lender, the wording of the particular due-on-sale clause needs to be carefully examined. State contract law principles arguably apply to due-on-sale
clauses contained in federal lenders' mortgages. This seems to have been made
explicit for those mortgages which are issued subsequent to the July 31, 1976
effective date of the applicable FHLBB regulation. The regulation provides
that the enforcement of these due-on-sale clauses is both a matter of contract
and is to be governed exclusively by the terms of the dauses.2 s1 Even if federal
preemption of the validity of the due-on-sale clause was found, its interpreta2 82
tion would continue to be a matter of state contract law.
In Florida, the interpretation given to a particular clause by a court may
be an important factor in allowing the clause to be exercised. The intent of
the contracting parties appears to be a potent argument when considering
the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause. 28 3 Since their inception, due-on-sale
clauses have been worded in a variety of ways.2s 4 The enforcement of the
clause, through foreclosure, is an equitable proceeding; therefore a court is
likely to attempt to construe the clause in favor of the borrower.- 5 This
tendency for strict and literal construction of due-on-sale clauses has already
2 88
been demonstrated in Florida.
280. The due-on-sale clause regulation only applies to "federal associations" as defined
in 12 C.F.R. §541.2. 12 C.F.R. §545-11(f)-(g) (1979).
281. 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(f) (1979).
282. See Gobel v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 670-71, 266 N.W.2d
352, 354 (1978).
283. Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons, Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151 N.J. Super. 502,
510-11, 377 A.2d 691, 695 (1977). In Rieder, the court's construction of the parties intent
relating to a due-on-sale clause resulted in a denial of enforcement of the clause.
284. Interview with Christopher Cook, Counsel for Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan
in West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978).
285. Interview with M. Julian Proctor, Jr., Counsel for Tallahassee Federal in Tallahassee
(Sept. 14, 1978).
286. See Stockman v. Burke, 249 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971). For example,
Uniform Covenant 17, which is now widely used by federal lenders, provides for the option
of accelerating the mortgage indebtedness upon the transfer of the property. Unfortunately,
a right to increase the interest rate is not explicitly tied to the property's transfer. The right
of the lender to increase the interest rate is instead addressed as one of two circumstances
under which a lender will waive its privilege to accelerate the loan. Thus, some courts
may narrowly construe the covenant to allow acceleration only where the lender's security
interests are threatened. A possible rationale for this position might be that an increase
in the loan's interest rate is not an affirmative right which is fully disclosed by the wording
of the covenant, but is merely one exception according to which the loan will not be accelerated. See First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 345 So. 2d 300, 303-04 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977);
Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629-30, 244 S.E.2d 580, 589-90 (1976)
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Various disclosure requirements are also relevant. At the threshold, the
practitioner should ascertain whether the due-on-sale clause was disclosed to
the borrower in accordance with the Federal Truth in Lending Act,s 7 if the
Act was operative at the time of execution. The FHLBB has enacted a statement of policy requiring some disclosure of the due-on-sale clause to borrowers.2-sB The fact that it is a policy statement, 28 9 is worded permissively,290 and
does not mandate what information is to be disclosed leaves open the effect
of the application of the Truth in Lending Act. Also, while most savings and
loans make some disclosure of the clause, there are others which do not.291
The only two known cases to have construed the application of the Truth
2
in Lending Act to the due-on-sale clause held that the Act did not apply.
However, neither decision considered the FHLBB statement of policy concerning the disclosure of the clause. Nor did they consider the provision in the
implementing regulations calling for a description of the type of security,-3
coupled with the broad requirement for meaningful disclosure,s4 which
(Lake, J., dissenting); Gobel v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 673-77, 266
N.W.2d 352, 855-56 (1978). See also Report on "Due-on" Clauses, supra note 178, at 932.
287. 15 U.S.C. §§1601-1666 (1976). Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board rulemaking ability to implement the provisions of the Act, which has been applied to general
consumer credit transactions through Regulation Z. 15 U.S.C. §1604 (1976); 12 C.F.R.
§226.1-.13 (1979). Also, the Act empowers the FHLBB to require compliance with provisions
of the Act by the savings and loan industry. 15 U.S.C. §1607(a)(2) (1976).
288. 12 C.F.R. §556.9(a) (1979).
289. Just what binding effect a "statement of policy" has, if any, is uncertain. One case
held that: "They represent a codification by the Board of those activities which directors
and officers of federal associations may not engage in. Having been published in the Federal
Register, these statements of policy are tantamount to regulations, having full force and
effect." Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 825 (N.D.
IlI. 1975). It is not clear whether the court is speaking in terms of a general rule concerning
statements of policy or just the one involved in that case.
290. The regulation states: "The Board expects associations to adopt procedures sufficient
to ensure that ... the rights and obligations of the contracting parties under these provisions
are fully and specifically disclosed to borrowers." 12 C.F.R. §556.9(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
291. Interview with Adam G. Adams, II, Counsel for Duval Federal Savings and Loan
Association in Jacksonville (Sept. 22, 1978); Interview with Vince Elhilow, Senior Vice
President, Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan in West Palm Beach (Sept. 6, 1978); Interview
with Ben Willis, Vice President, Tallahassee Federal in Tallahassee (Sept. 14, 1978).
292. Croysdale v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 601 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1979); Bartlett v. Commercial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 433 F. Supp. 284, 287-89 P3. Neb. 1977). The court in
Bartlett recognized that there was a split of authority on whether acceleration clauses in
general were covered by the regulation which called for disclosure of "a default, delinquency
or similar charges." 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(4) (1979). Still the court held that the due-on-sale
clause need not be disclosed, as long as no additional penalty was assessed or additional
charge made. 438 F. Supp. at 287-89. In Croysdale, the Seventh Circuit held that a lender was
under no duty to disclose a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage either under Regulation Z or
the Truth in Lending Act. The court reasoned that the exercise of the clause, under the
facts in that case, had no bearing upon the costs or terms of financing as required by the
regulation and the Act. 601 F.2d at 1843-44.
293. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(5) (1979). The argument can be made that the importance
of a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage makes it a basic provision that should be discussed
in any type of disclosure.
294. 12 C.F.R. §226.6(a) (1979). See Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 895 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D. Or.
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could be interpreted to bring the clause under the Act. If a violation of the
Act were found, the mortgage would still be valid, - 5 but civil liability for
certain monetary penalities provided in the Act could arise.- 6 Ultimately,
negotiation with the lender should be vigorously pursued. So far, few lenders
in Florida have been willing to engage in highly speculative litigation to obtain
enforcement of the clause. 297 Therefore, a compromise can usually be reached,
due to the purely financial nature of the problem, which may be fair to
both parties.
In addition to enforcement problems, the possibility exists that borrowers
may attempt to avoid the clause by use of an agreement for deed, instead of
transferring the property outright. Some reliance may be placed upon the
Chopanr case, where an agreement for deed was held not to be a "sale" which
would violate that particular due-on-sale clause.- s It is important to note,
however, that the language in the mortgage used by most federal lenders is
extremely broad regarding sales under the clause. The clause becomes operative when an "interest" in the property is sold or transferred.2 9 Therefore,
even though the seller retains legal title in the installment sale the purchaser
does obtain an equitable interest which may bring the transfer within the
clause.300 Nevertheless, a possible conflict in the FHLBB regulations governing
the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause may offer the borrower a tenable argument to prevent enforcement of the clause.301
Under one provision, a due-on-sale clause may not be exercised when its
exercise is based upon the creation of an encumbrance subordinate to the
lender's mortgage.3 0 2 Florida case law has determined that an agreement for
deed is deemed to be a mortgage. 30 3 In addition, an agreement for deed would
be subordinate to a prior mortgage. 30 4 It could be argued that an agreement
for deed is an encumbrance within the exception described above. A last resort
attempt to avoid enforcement of the due-on-sale clause might be the lease
of the property with an option to purchase. The FHLBB regulations, however,
1975). In Woods, disclosure of an acceleration provision for late payment was at issue. The
court held that such a right was of obvious concern to the buyers and must be disclosed
under the regulation mandating "meaningful disclosure." Id.
295. See Grandway Credit Corp. v. Brown, 295 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
296. 15 U.S.C. §1640 (1976).
297. Letter from H. L. Cooper, Jr., Esq., to Brian O'Connell (July 10, 1979).
298. Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So. 2d at 155. See Martyn v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
257 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971). The district court of appeal in Martyn defined
a sale as involving the transfer of title, apparently legal title.
299. FNMA-FHLMC Uniform Instrument 6175,%117.
300. See H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1972).
301. See Comment, Mortgages - Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraint on Alienation -Enforceability, 28 CAsE W. Ras. L. Rav. 503, 510 n.40 (1978).
302. "[A] Federal association may not exercise a due-on-sale clause based on any of the
following: (i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security
instrument .... ." 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(g)(1)(i) (1979).
303. See, e.g., Torcise v. Perez, 319 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975); Hoffman v.
Semet, 316 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
304. See Baron v. Aiello, 319 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975). According to the
court, a purchase money mortgage takes priority over any subsequent lien. Id.
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specifically allow use of the clause where a lease-option agreement is executed.305 In addition, the use of a "wrap-around mortgage - 3 may not avoid
the operation of a legally enforceable due-on-sale clause, as it is the transfer
07
of title which triggers the operation of the dause
CONCLUSION

The federal approach to the due-on-sale clause is likely to have the greatest
overall effect. The variable rate mortgage, an alternative mortgage form which
has been approved by the FHLBB,0°s should be widely publicized and used.
This new mortgage form directly and realistically satisfies the need for lenders
to cope with tight money conditions. The use of the due-on-sale clause should
be restricted to the standard fixed rate mortgage30 9 and should only be used
in loans made to commercial borrowers. Most importantly, for both present
and future loan transactions, the FHLBB should mandate specific and understandable disclosure of the use and possible effect of a due-on-sale clause in a
mortgage. Following these procedures will enable a borrower to intelligently
choose among the available mortgage forms and uniformity of instruments
will be maintained.
Because of the paucity of Florida case law, legislation based on analogous
Arizona, California, and Colorado statutes should be considered to regulate
the use of the clause. 310 However, any legislation should exempt those
mortgages executed pursuant to the 1976 FHLBB regulation approving
the use of the due-on-sale clause. Otherwise, the legislation would be ripe for
challenge by a federal lender. Absent any legislation, the equitable approach
of the Clark decision should be followed with particular attention paid to
the flexibility demonstrated in dealing with the varied fact situations that
may occur. Finally, the routine of an attorney handling a real estate transaction should include an examination of a mortgage for a due-on-sale clause
and the discussion of the clause with the client.
505. "[A] Federal association may not exercise a due-on-sale clause based on any of the
following: ...Grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option
to purchase." 12 C.F.R. §545.6-11(g)(l)(iv) (1979) (emphasis added).
306. See, e.g., Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (Fla. 1954).
307. See Comment, The Wraparound Mortgage, A Critical Inquiry, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.

1529, 1539-47 (1974).
308. 12 C.F.R. §545.6-2 (1979). The interest rate on a variable rate mortgage is tied to
an index which reflects interest rate changes. The mortgage rate is subject to yearly adjustment of plus or minus 0.5 percent a year and 2.5 percent for the life of the loan. Id. As might

be expected, there are conflicting views concerning the relative advantages of the variable
rate mortgage. Notably there is a concern with the shift of the risk to the borrower of a
climb in interest rates. CONSUMER REPOR-s, Jan. 1979 at 17.
309. Despite the interest raising features of the variable rate mortgage, the FHLBB still
intends to use the due-on-sale clause to maximize the return on a loan. Letter from Jerome
S. Plapinger, Associate General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board to Brian O'Connell
(July 18, 1978).
310.

See note 119 supra. Use of the Law Revision Counsel to study possible legislation

is more likely to obtain an objective result than would subjecting the proposals to the
various special interest groups in the legislature, So4 .A,STAT. §18.96 (1979).
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